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UncertaintyRisk is a ubiquitous feature of the environment for all organisms. Very few things in life are achieved with
absolute certainty. Therefore, it is essential that organisms process risky information efﬁciently to pro-
mote adaptive behaviour and enhance survival. Here we outline a clear deﬁnition of economic risk
derived from economic theory and focus on two experiments in which we have shown subpopulations
of single neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex of rhesus macaques that code either economic risk per se
or an error-related risk signal, namely a risk prediction error. These biological risk signals are essential
for processing and updating risky information in the environment to contribute to efﬁcient decision mak-
ing and adaptive behaviour.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
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Everyone is familiar with the concept of ‘risk’ but there is con-
siderable variation in the common conception of the term, which
can be easily exempliﬁed by asking your friends what ‘risk’ means
to them.
In 1921 the economist FrankKnight deﬁneduncertainty as either
‘risk’ or ‘ambiguity’. Knight deﬁned risk as a quantity with known
outcome values and known outcome probabilities and ambiguity
as a quantity with known outcome values and unknown probabili-
ties. Essentially Knight deﬁned ‘risk’ as a measurable quantity of
uncertainty that is distinct from immeasurable uncertainty (ambi-
guity). Although this is an accepted deﬁnition of ‘risk’ in the ﬁeldof economics, your friends will undoubtedly provide you with sev-
eral other deﬁnitions of ‘risk’ as they understand it.
The variation in people’s deﬁnitions of risk is not simply due to
naivety of the economic deﬁnition; the Oxford English Dictionary
deﬁnes risk as ‘the possibility of loss, injury, or other adverse or
unwelcome circumstance’. This dictionary deﬁnition invokes per-
haps the most prevalent and common conception of risk outside
of economic theory as a probabilistic sense of loss. This is not the
case with the economic deﬁnition, as the possible outcomes in eco-
nomic risk can be exclusively positive (or negative). Therefore,
Knight’s contribution to the economic theory of risk was to deﬁne
risk as a measurable quantity that captures the dispersion of prob-
abilistic outcomes whether they are positive, negative or both.
The dispersion of probabilistic outcomes is typicallymeasured as
the variance, standard deviation (square root of variance) or the
coefﬁcient of variation (variance/expected value). Note that
economic risk is distinct from reward probability, which has a
non-monotonic relationship with risk: risk is maximal when
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occur increases from p = 0.5 to p = 1 and the certainty that an
outcome will not occur increases from p = 0.5 to p = 0 (Fig 1;
O’Neill and Kobayashi, 2009). As such, probability captures the
likelihood of outcomes whereas risk captures the dispersion of
possible outcomes (Burke and Tobler, 2011). For example, to
demonstrate the distinction between economic risk and reward
probability, imagine playing a simple game based on the outcome
of tossing a coin. The probability of the coin landing on heads or tails
is equal to 0.5. However, the economic risk in the game can be
manipulated by offering different outcomes for heads or tails, say
either 90p for heads or 10p for tails versus 60p for heads versus
40p for tails. The former option is considered more risky than the
latter due to the larger dispersion in possible outcomes.
Note that in this example outcome probability = 0.5 due to the
fact that there are two possible outcomes from a coin toss. The
two-outcome approach has been utilised in the majority of neuro-
scientiﬁc investigations of risk processing,which comprise the focus
of this article. This approach facilitates themost straightforward and
simplemethod of orthogonalization of the independent variables of
interest in such studies, namely reward probability, value and risk.
Nonetheless, early work investigating the performance of patients
with focal brain lesions using multiple outcomes highlighted the
role of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in risk processing
(Sanfey et al., 2003), a ﬁnding that has subsequently been corrobo-
rated in task designs using the two-outcome approach (Xue et al.,
2009). Therefore, riskmaybeprocessed similarly in taskswitheither
two outcomes or multiple outcomes.
A key area of interest for economists, psychologists and behav-
ioural ecologists iswhether organismsare sensitive to economic risk
and the effect of economic risk on decision making and adaptive
behaviour. Also, neuroscientists have begun addressing whether
particular areas of the brain are responsible for processing economic
risk, a putative necessity for informing decision-making mecha-
nisms and adaptive behaviour.
1.1. Economic risk coding by single neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC)
Damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) in
humans has been shown to affect decision making underFig. 1. Economic risk and probability. Schematic of the non-monotonic relationship
between economic risk, deﬁned as mathematical variance, and probability.
Economic risk is maximal when probability equals 0.5 and is minimal (zero) when
probability equals 0 or 1.conditions of uncertainty in gambling tasks involving probabilistic
judgements (Rogers et al., 1999; Clark et al., 2008) and economic
risk (Sanfey et al., 2003). Activations in the human OFC, which is
adjacent to the VMPFC, vary with economic risk (Critchley et al.,
2001; Hsu et al., 2005; Tobler et al., 2007). Although these studies
indicate a role of the OFC in risk processing, it is not possible to
directly infer a role of single neurons in the OFC based on lesion
studies or imaging techniques such as fMRI, which lacks the spatial
and temporal resolution required. Speciﬁcally, lesion studies pro-
vide data that results from the absence of neurons and fMRI data
captures the ﬂow of oxygenated blood (BOLD signal) within voxels
that contain several thousand neurons. Also, the temporal sam-
pling of the BOLD signal is too low to detect brain activity at the
frequencies of the ﬁring rates of single neurons. Therefore, the
detection of speciﬁc signals from individual neurons pertaining
towards speciﬁc decision variables, such as risk and value, is not
possible with current fMRI techniques. Therefore, we designed an
experiment to test whether single neurons in the OFC process eco-
nomic risk (O’Neill and Schultz, 2010). We employed rhesus maca-
ques as an animal model and we designed a behavioural risk
experiment for the monkeys to perform while we inserted single
electrodes in the OFC and recorded from single neurons in the
awake behaving monkey.
Monkeys were trained to associate different visual cues with
three binary symmetric equiprobable reward distributions that dif-
fered in economic risk (Fig 2). This design is essentially a simula-
tion of the coin toss example described above: reward
probability for all risk cues was equal to 0.5 and only the economic
risk varied. Likewise, the expected value was equal for each risk
cue. The orthogonal relationship between mean and variance facil-
itates manipulation of variance with ﬁxed expected value. This is
formally referred to as a mean preserving spread of risk
(Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). This approach provides a frame-
work in which sensitivity to risk can be experimentally tested in
procedures that control for reward maximisation strategies and
directly assess whether or not animals are sensitive to risk infor-
mation per se.
Thus, this approach allowed us to behaviourally assess the
monkeys’ risk preference and neuronal responses independent of
a confounding reward maximisation strategy on behaviour or an
expected value signal in neurons. In addition, we trained the mon-
keys on two sets of risky cues that varied in visual properties in
order to control for potential neuronal responses coding the visual
properties of the cues. The cues were presented on either the left or
right side of a computer monitor requiring the monkeys’ to make
eye movements to the corresponding side in order to receive
reward to test whether neuronal responses were related to the
action required to receive reward. Also, riskless cues that varied
only in reward magnitude were used to explicitly test for any sen-
sitivity of neurons to changes in value.
When the monkeys were given a choice between the risky cues
and a safe cue of the same expected value they preferred the risky
options with a monotonic increase in preference with higher risk.
This preference was independent of the visual properties of the
cues; the monkeys preferred the higher risk options irrespective
of whether the risk information was explicitly displayed on the
cues or not (bar and fractal cues in Fig 2, respectively). They also
responded quicker to the more risky cues. Taken together these
results suggest the monkeys were risk seeking. Recordings from
single neurons revealed subpopulations of OFC neurons that were
sensitive to the economic risk associated with the visual cues and
represented the economic risk by an increase or decrease in ﬁring
rate (Fig 3A and B respectively). Fig. 4A and B shows OFC neurons
coding risk independent of the visual properties of the cues. Fig. 4C
and D shows the same OFC neurons coding risk independent of the
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Fig. 2. Risky cues. Monkeys were trained to associate visual cues with risky reward outcomes. The vertical position of the horizontal bars indicates the reward (volume of
juice) to be delivered at the end of a trial: the higher the bar, the greater the volume of juice. Two bars indicate that one of two possible reward volumes would be delivered
with a probability of 0.5. Monkeys were also trained on an additional set of fractal cues, with no explicit visual information, to control for any possible effects of the visual
properties of the bar cues on behaviour and neuronal activity. Reward probability and expected value were equal for all cues.
72 M. O’Neill, W. Schultz / Journal of Physiology - Paris 109 (2015) 70–77reward. Therefore, the risk signal observed in OFC neurons is inde-
pendent of visuomotor contingencies.
Since the monkeys preferred the riskier options it was impera-
tive to test whether the neuronal responses were indeed reﬂecting
the risk information conveyed by the cues or the monkeys behav-
ioural preference. This was tested in a subpopulation of risk sensi-
tive neurons by presenting the monkeys with safe value cues that
varied only in value and not risk. The majority of neurons tested
with both risk and value selectively responded differentially to
either risk or value (Fig 5), albeit a small but statistically signiﬁcant
population also responded to both. Of the 126 cue-responsive neu-
rons tested with both the risk and value cues, 16 (13%) correlated
signiﬁcantly with risk and 42 (33%) correlated with value. The sep-
arate coding of value and risk precludes salience coding in these
neurons as both risk and value convey salience to a similar degree,
as indicated in the animals behavioural preferences and reaction
times, yet elicit differential neuronal responses.
This ﬁnding contrasts with a study suggesting salience coding by
OFCneurons (Ogawaet al., 2013).However, in this study theneuronal
responses also appear to reﬂect the animals’ behavioural perfor-
mance. Thereforeanalternative explanation for theobservedﬁndings
may be that the OFC neurons are coding other aspects of behaviouralLow risk 
Med risk 
High risk A 
Fig. 3. Orbitofrontal neurons code economic risk. Smoothed histograms show responses f
slope (B). Color coding of the cues in the ﬁgure legend is for presentation purposes onlyperformance independent of salience, speciﬁcally the animals’
subjective preference for the different reward conditions, which
could be driving both the behaviour and the neuronal responses
independent of salience. Given that we tested for this potential
caveat by comparing the risk and value responses of OFC neurons it
is unlikely that the neurons responding signiﬁcantly to risk and not
value in our study reﬂect the salience of the risk cues, as we would
expect a similar neuronal response to the value cues if this were
the case. In addition, a fMRI study in humans has identiﬁed a value
signal in the OFC that is independent of salience coding (Kahnt
et al., 2014). Nonetheless, a small but statistically signiﬁcant
proportion of neurons coded both risk and value (7/126; 6%)
therefore displaying activity that could be driven by salience coding.
Future studies of risk and salience coding will beneﬁt from clear
orthogonalization of behaviouralmeasures, risk and salience in order
to clearly delineate the effects of these variables on neuronal activity.1.2. Economic risk prediction error coding by OFC neurons
In a follow up study to our identiﬁcation of risk coding neurons




rom two example neurons coding economic risk with positive slope (A) and negative
. Data from O’Neill and Schultz (2010), with permission from Elsevier.
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Fig. 4. Orbitofrontal neurons code economic risk independent of visuomotor contingencies. Smoothed histograms show averaged population responses from neurons coding
economic risk independent of whether it was indicated by bar cues (A) or fractal cues (B). The same population of neurons also coded economic risk independent of whether
an eye movement to the left (C) or right (D) was required for reward. Color coding of the bar cues in the ﬁgure legend is for presentation purposes only. Data from O’Neill and
Schultz (2010), with permission from Elsevier.
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2013).
Prediction errors are a general phenomenon that can be derived
from any variable that can be measured and represents the dis-
crepancy between what is predicted to happen and what actually
happens. For example, whenever we expect anything, such as the
temperature outside when we leave the house in the morning,
the brightness of our computer monitor when we ﬁrst turn it on
or how much we are going to enjoy an article on the coding of eco-
nomic risk by OFC neurons, we generate a prediction and any vio-
lation of this prediction is considered a prediction error.
Numerically a prediction error is calculated as the experienced
outcome minus the expected outcome.
Following this rationale, a risk prediction error is calculated as
experienced risk minus predicted risk. In our experiment, the pre-
dicted risk is the risk measured as the standard deviation of the
reward distribution of all possible outcomes in the experiment
(six in total). The experienced risk is the risk indicated by the visual
cue on any given trial. Therefore, there is a predicted level of risk at
the beginning of a trial when the monkeys are required to ﬁxate on
a neutral stimulus (a red dot in the centre of the computer moni-
tor). This predicted risk is calculated as the standard deviation of
the six possible rewards available at the end of the trial (Fig 6A,
maroon arrow). Subsequently, a risk cue appears presenting the
experienced risk on a given trial, calculated as the standarddeviation of binary reward distribution represented by each cue
(Fig 6B, blue arrows). The risk prediction error is the numerical dif-
ference between the predicted risk and the experienced risk (Fig
6A, green arrows). Note that in our experimental design the
expected value was held constant for all risk cues therefore there
was no reward value prediction error at the cue because the mean
reward value prediction was equal at the time of the ﬁxation spot
and the time of the cue (and indeed throughout the whole trial).
We identiﬁed and characterised OFC neurons that code the
absolute value of risk prediction errors with either an increase or
decrease in ﬁring rate (Fig 6B and C). The regression slope for these
neurons is signiﬁcantly greater for risk prediction error compared
to risk per se (average standardised regression coefﬁcient, SRC,
for neurons with positive slope = 0.29 versus 0.02 for risk,
F(1,28) = 5.31, p = 0.03; average SRC for neurons with negative
slope = 0.26 versus 0.01 for risk, F(1,34) = 48.36, p < 0.001; one
way ANOVA). In addition, the amount of variance explained, mea-
sured as the coefﬁcient of partial determination, was not correlated
between risk prediction error and risk (Pearson’s r = 0.02, p = 0.9).
Taken together these data show that the population of OFC neu-
rons coding risk prediction error are largely separate from the
OFC neurons coding risk per se.
Therefore, single OFC neurons code either economic risk per se,
as measured by reward variance or standard deviation, or devia-





Fig. 5. Economic risk and value coding. Smoothed histograms show orbitofrontal neurons that coded either the economic risk associated with reward and not value (A and B)
or the value and not the risk (C and D). Color coding of the cues in the ﬁgure legend is for presentation purposes only. Data from O’Neill and Schultz (2010), with permission
from Elsevier.
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ing to rewarding outcomes under conditions of risk and uncer-
tainty are likely to be vital for tracking risky information in the
environment and comprise part of the neuronal architecture neces-
sary for efﬁcient decision making and adaptive behaviour in risky
situations.2. Other single neuron studies on economic risk
A previous study on single neuron activity in the rat OFC iden-
tiﬁed a decision-related risk signal (Kepecs et al., 2008). OFC neu-
rons ﬁred more (or less) when decisions involved maximal
uncertainty (p = 0.5) compared to decisions with more or less cer-
tainty. An economic risk signal has also been identiﬁed in midbrain
dopamine neurons (Fiorillo et al., 2003), posterior cingulate cortex
(McCoy and Platt, 2005), supplementary eye ﬁeld (So and
Stuphorn, 2010) and the anterodorsal septal region in rhesus
macaques (Monosov and Hikosaka, 2013). These studies identiﬁed
single neurons that were selective for economic risk independent
of reward probability. Moreover, the risk signal in the septal region
was speciﬁc to rewarding outcomes – the neurons did not respond
to risky stimuli predicting negative, aversive outcomes.The risk signal in OFC neurons in our study (Fig. 4C and D;
O’Neill and Schultz, 2010) and in Kepecs et al. (2008) is indepen-
dent of the actions required to receive reward, whereas economic
risk signals in cingulate cortex (McCoy and Platt, 2005) and the
caudate nucleus (Yanike and Ferrera, 2014) provide information
about the actions required to receive risky rewards. Subpopula-
tions of supplementary eye ﬁeld neurons code either economic risk
independent of action or related to action (So and Stuphorn,
2010).Therefore, economic risk appears to be coded in the brain
at the single neuron level and in a distributed fashion, with a high
level abstraction of risk represented in OFC and action-dependent
risk represented in the cingulate cortex, supplementary eye ﬁeld
and caudate nucleus.
In addition, the onset of the risk signal in OFC neurons occurs as
soon as 100 ms after cue presentation. This latency is shorter than
the risk-related responses in dopamine neurons, cingulate cortex
and caudate nucleus. Speciﬁcally, the risk-related responses in
dopamine neurons begins relatively late after cue presentation
and ramps up gradually until reward delivery (Fiorillo et al.,
2003). In the cingulate cortex and caudate nucleus, the risk activity
was most clearly observed after movement had been initiated or
reward delivered, respectively (McCoy and Platt, 2005; Yanike

















Fig. 6. Orbitofrontal neurons code risk prediction error. (A) Schematic illustration of the measures of predicted risk, experienced risk and risk prediction error (experienced
risk minus predicted risk) for each risky cue. (B) Smoothed histograms show averaged population responses from neurons coding risk prediction error with positive slope
(left) or negative slope (right). Data from O’Neill and Schultz (2013).
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related risk responses (So and Stuphorn, 2010). Therefore, the risk
sensitive OFC neurons may constitute an early component of a sys-
tem that processes risky information, perhaps before it is transmit-
ted to other brain areas such as the ventral tegmental region
(dopamine neurons), supplementary eye ﬁeld, cingulate cortex
and caudate nucleus. This early response conceivably allows the
OFC neurons to participate in detecting risk in decision situations
involving uncertainty.3. A note on variability in risk attitude
Although the risk seeking nature of the monkeys in our experi-
ment may seem at odds with humans, who are generally consid-
ered risk averse, this is not the case. Risk attitude is a non-stable
phenomenon with many reported cases of inter- and intra-species
variability. For example, as famously described by Kahneman and
Tversky, humans tend to be risk averse in the gain domain and risk
seeking in the loss domain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992). A similar observation has been reported in
New World monkeys (Chen et al., 2006; Lakshminarayanan et al.,
2011). Moreover, when humans play for low-stake gambles, they
are risk seeking, a phenomenon known as the ‘playing for peanuts’
effect (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991; Weber and Chapman, 2005).
Despite the fact that the volumes of juice used in our experiment
were behaviourally discriminable, they were small in volume in
respect to the overall volume of juice the monkey would bedelivered in a day and over the course of a week (20 ml/kg daily
ration; 24 h free access to water per week during the experiment).
Therefore, with an average juice volume of 0.3 ml per trial, it is
conceivable that the risk-seeking attitude of the monkeys in this
experimental context may reﬂect the ‘playing for peanuts’ effect
observed in humans. The observation of risk seeking behaviour in
experimentally controlled rhesus macaques is not restricted to
our experiment and has been observed both in other animals in
our laboratory and in other laboratories (McCoy and Platt, 2005;
Seo and Lee, 2009; So and Stuphorn, 2010; Fiorillo, 2011;
Heilbronner et al., 2011; Lak et al., 2014; Strait et al., 2014; Xu
and Kralik, 2014) with one exception reporting weak risk aversion
(Yamada et al., 2013). However, in the latter study monkeys that
were deemed less ‘thirsty’ showed reductions in risk aversion, con-
sistent with the ‘playing for peanuts’ effect.4. Implications of neuroscience research on economic risk
Identiﬁcation of the existence of a biological substrate for eco-
nomic risk coding has implications for the application of behav-
ioural economic theory to the study of neuroscience. There are
several different theoretical approaches in the ﬁeld of economic
theory that attempt to capture and describe decision making under
conditions of uncertainty. The predominant theories in economics
and ﬁnance are expected utility theory (von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944), prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979) and the mean–variance approach (Levy and Markowitz,
76 M. O’Neill, W. Schultz / Journal of Physiology - Paris 109 (2015) 70–771979). Prospect theory is essentially an extension of expected util-
ity theory and both these approaches can be considered as categor-
ically distinct from a mean–variance approach.
This categorical distinction is derived from the fact that neither
expected utility theory nor prospect theory rely on risky informa-
tion per se whereas risk (as variance) is a central tenet of the
mean–variance approach. Under the normative assumptions of
expected utility and prospect theory, a non-linear value function
is capable of capturing risk attitude independent of a requirement
on risk per se. For example, the curvature of a utility function cap-
tures the risk attitude of an organism as either risk averse (with a
concave, decelerating utility function) or risk seeking (with a con-
vex, accelerating utility function). The same rationale may be
applied to descriptive, process-based explanations of risk sensitiv-
ity that take into account behavioural observations, learning the-
ory and cognitive processes (Kacelnik and Bateson, 1997): risk
sensitivity might represent a skewed weighting of inﬂuence of
unconditioned stimuli (rewarding outcomes) that bias an organ-
isms preference for a risky (conditioned) stimulus. In other words,
with binary-symmetric outcomes, as in our experiment, if an
organism has a non-linear accelerating convex value function then
that organism will place more value on the higher of the two
rewards compared to the lower reward and therefore will prefer
higher risk situations as a direct consequence (and vice versa for
an organism with a non-linear decelerating concave function). Nei-
ther of these normative or descriptive approaches requires risk
information per se at the time of uncertainty (before outcome) to
be processed by a decision maker. It is the non-linearity of the util-
ity function that determines how much more a decision maker
gains by higher outcomes compared to losing from lower out-
comes. Alternatively, the mean–variance approach assigns critical
relevance to the ﬁrst two moments of reward probability distribu-
tions, namely the expected value and the variance. Accordingly,
under the assumptions of the mean–variance approach, a decision
maker will be inﬂuenced directly by the expected value and the
variance of possible outcomes under conditions of risk and
uncertainty.
Although our data do not preclude the existence of neuronal
mechanisms that comply with the assumptions of other economic
models of decision making under risk and uncertainty, they do
support the existence of a neuronal architecture involving the
OFC that is explicitly sensitive to risk and expected value in accor-
dance with the mean–variance approach.5. Conclusions
Economic risk signals have been identiﬁed in single neurons
and in distributed brain regions. The OFC risk signal is unique
because it is independent of sensory and motor information there-
fore representing a high level abstraction of economic risk infor-
mation. This high level abstraction of reward-related information
processing in the OFC is not unprecedented. Economic values mea-
sured as subjective preferences for different reward types are also
represented by a high level abstract coding mechanism in the OFC
(Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Padoa-Schioppa and Cai, 2011).
Moreover, the abstract economic value signal in OFC is trans-
formed into an action-related value signal in lateral prefrontal cor-
tex (Cai and Padoa-Schioppa, 2014). Thus the economic risk and
value signals in single neurons in the OFC represent a high level
abstraction of reward-related information processing that is likely
transmitted to other brain structures to guide decision making,
action selection and adaptive behaviour under risk and
uncertainty.
Characterisation of the risk signal at the single neuron level in
the OFC has advanced the knowledge provided by human studiesthat indicated a possible function for the OFC in processing risky
information (Critchley et al., 2001; Hsu et al., 2005; Tobler et al.,
2007). In particular with the demonstration that single neurons
code risk and risk prediction error with either positive or negative
slope (Figs. 3 and 6 respectively), and that separate neurons code
either risk per se or risk prediction error. Indeed, it may not be pos-
sible with the current levels of sensitivity of fMRI techniques to
detect such differential signals, which could conceivably cancel
each other out in the signal obtained with fMRI, or be processed
too quickly for detection.6. Future directions
The risk signal observed in single OFC neurons to date is largely
derived from objective measures of risk, which serve as an inde-
pendent variable in the analysis of neuronal activity. Interestingly,
the risk-related activity of neurons in the anterodorsal septal
region is not exclusively objective as these neurons only code risk
information pertaining to rewarding outcomes and not aversive
outcomes (Monosov and Hikosaka, 2013). Moreover, the risk signal
observed in human OFC and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is mod-
ulated by the risk preference of individual subjects (Tobler et al.,
2007, 2009). Therefore, in order to further elucidate the risk coding
properties of neurons in the OFC, future studies will beneﬁt from
designs incorporating rewarding and aversive outcomes as well
as manipulations of individual risk attitude to test how these fac-
tors affect the risk coding properties of these neurons.
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